In intertemporal models of household consumption or portfolio choice, household behaviour depends on, for example, the household's rate of time preference, the rate of risk aversion, and the household's information set. In this paper we use a survey of Dutch households which contains direct subjective information on risk aversion and time preference and on interest in ®nancial matters. We ®rst describe these data and analyze how they relate to household characteristics and household income. We then investigate whether these variables are related to households' ®nancial decisions on home ownership, mortgages and ownership of risky assets. Our results are broadly in accordance with economic theory. Ó (B. Donkers).
Introduction
In models of household consumption or portfolio choice, household preferences play an important role in various ways. Mainstream economic theory of household consumption and saving behavior is based upon the life cycle hypothesis (see, e.g., Deaton, 1992; Browning & Lusardi, 1996) . Here household preferences depend, among other things, on the rate of time preference and the household's rate of risk aversion. In the standard twoperiod Markowitz model of portfolio choice (Markowitz, 1952) , the choice between holding risky and risk-free assets will depend on the agent's risk aversion parameter. In extensions of this model, the rate of time preference also plays a role. See for example the model of Henderson and Ioannides (1983) , which explains household consumption and investment in ®nancial as well as housing wealth.
In empirical studies in the above ®elds, direct information on the household's rate of risk aversion or time preference is never used, at least to our knowledge. The reasons are twofold. First, such information is usually not available. We know of no previous survey with information on portfolios or savings and consumption in which this type of subjective information is present. Second, according to Dominitz and Manski (1997) , many economists are sceptical about the use of information based upon subjective survey questions in general. In various recent studies however, subjective information on income expectations is used (Guiso, Japelli & Terlizzese, 1992 , 1996 , suggesting that the tide is changing.
In this paper we use two waves of a panel survey of Dutch households drawn in 1993 and 1995. This data set has two properties which make it particularly useful for our purposes. First, it contains detailed information on many asset and liability holdings, including home ownership and mortgages. Second, it contains a number of`psychological' variables. These contain subjective information which can be used to measure household preferences directly. We shall use three such variables, measuring time preference, risk aversion, and the household's interest in ®nancial matters.
The ®rst purpose of our paper is to describe these data, to analyze their internal validity (i.e., to see whether sample distributions of the psychological variables make sense), and to see to which extent they can be explained from household characteristics and household income. The second purpose is to investigate whether these variables are helpful to explain households' ®nancial decisions. An extensive study of debts and assets of Dutch households was carried out by Ritzema and Homan (1991) . They analyze economic, sociological, and psychological explanations using cross section data for 1988. They do not use the type of psychological variables that we have here, however. We focus on decisions related to home ownership and mortgages. As in many countries, investment in (owner occupied) housing is the most important component in household portfolios in The Netherlands. On average, it represents more than 60% of households' gross assets (see Alessie, Lusardi & Aldershof, 1997, for example) . Similarly, mortgage debt is by far the largest type of liability: more than 80% of all debts is mortgage debt (Alessie et al., 1997) . We also consider the choice whether or not to hold risky ®nancial assets. While more than 80% of Dutch households hold ®nancial assets, less than 10% hold risky assets like stocks and bonds. Why few people hold stocks and bonds has been the topic of studies for other countries (see Haliassos & Bertaut, 1995) . Here we can test directly whether holding risky assets is related to the head of household's subjectively measured rate of risk aversion.
Throughout the paper, we rely on static reduced form univariate models. Our equations explain ®nancial decisions from subjectively measured variables and other household characteristics, and we do not address the issue of potential endogeneity of subjective variables. The conceptual model we have in mind is therefore rather straightforward: household characteristics (family composition, income, labor market status) are given, household preferences (time preference, interest in ®nancial matters, risk aversion) may vary with these characteristics, and household ®nancial decisions (home ownership, value of owned housing, mortgage, portfolio choice) are driven by family characteristics and preferences. This conceptual model may be overly sim-pli®ed, but given the limitations of our data, and particularly the short length of the panel, we feel we cannot identify much more at this stage.
We focus on the question whether the correlations we ®nd can be explained from economic theory. In most cases we ®nd that they can, even when other variables are controlled for. This leads to the conclusion that subjective information is valuable in estimating structural models of economic household behavior, in which endogeneity, dynamics, and causal relationships should be taken into account.
As argued above, our ®ndings are of interest for empirical economic research of household behavior under uncertainty, in a life cycle context, or both. They should help to improve our knowledge of the heterogeneity among household preferences which is relevant for household decision making. They are also of potential interest to marketeers of banks and insurance companies, etc., who may use our type of results to design new products which optimally ®t consumer preferences, such as speci®c types of mutual funds, life insurances or private pension plans, or mortgages. They can also use the results to address their marketing eorts for speci®c products to groups of households whose preferences are such that they will, on average, be most interested in buying these products.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief description of the data in general. Then we analyze the subjective measures of time preference, risk aversion, and interest in ®nancial matters. Emphasis is put on the rate of time preference, which can be measured in dierent ways, based upon nine dierent questions in the survey. In Section 3, we consider the home ownership decision, using a binary probit model. In Section 4, we explain the value of the house, conditional on home ownership, using linear regression. In Section 5, we explain the mortgage as a fraction of the purchase value of the house, again conditioning on home ownership. Here we use a censored regression model, to take account of the fact that many home owners do not have a mortgage. In Section 6, we analyze ®nancial wealth holdings with emphasis on the choice between risky and risk-free assets. Section 7 concludes.
Data and description of subjective variables
We use two waves of the CentER Data panel, the ®rst wave, drawn in 1993, and the third wave, drawn in 1995. The 1994 wave was drawn only a few months after the 1993 wave, and contains little new information for our purposes. Cleaned versions of later waves are not yet available. Nyhus (1996) describes the set up of this data set and its general quality. She also discusses the possible sample bias due to nonresponse problems. Daniel (1994) uses the ®rst wave of this data set and speci®cally focuses on time preference variables.
The panel consists of two subpanels. The ®rst is representative of the Dutch population, the other one is designed to represent households in the upper 10% of the income distribution. We will refer to the two subpanels as the representative panel (REP) and the high income panel (HIP), respectively. All households participating have been provided with a personal computer and answer the survey questions directly on their PC; no personal interviews are held. The questionnaires contain various sections: household characteristics, housing, labor market status and pension entitlements, health, income, and assets and liabilities. Not all households have answered the questions in all sections. The subjective variables we are interested in are contained in the psychological section. In 1993, 2258 of the 2775 households in the panel have completed this section, and 2251 of these have completed all sections of the questionnaire. Usually, the questions are answered by the head of household. In some cases, the partner has answered the psychological questions, and the head has not. In these cases we use the partner information (and her background variables such as age and education level). In 1995 In , 2037 of the 2766 answer the questions in the psychological section, and 2035 of them have completed all sections of the questionnaire. Thus in both years, nonresponse to the psychological questions was quite large, as also mentioned by Daniel (1994) and Nyhus (1996) . Due to item nonresponse on mainly income (for 20% household income could not be computed), psychological questions (about 28% in 1993, 21% in 1995), or assets (about 22% in 1993 and 1995) , the data set is further reduced to 1155 households in 1993 and 1275 in 1995. The representative panel has 651 observations in 1993 and 822 in 1995, the high income panel 504 and 453. Some item nonresponse in the psychological questionnaire is due to a question on risk aversion which is only asked if net household income is above D¯. 20,000 (about $10,000).
In this section, we pay attention to some variables derived from the subjective information in the questionnaire. These variables are the household's subjective interest rate, a measure of risk aversion, and a measure of interest in ®nancial matters. Variables related to housing assets will be discussed in the next sections. The appendix contains some details on the background variables we use. In the ®gures, which we present to describe the data, we will use the 1995 data, except for the ®gures on interest in ®nancial matters. All ®gures for the 1993 sample appeared to be similar to those for 1995, and we therefore do not present them.
Subjective interest rates
The survey collects information on how individuals evaluate a delay or speed-up of receiving or paying a certain amount of money. In total, nine (series of) questions are asked, diering on the following points (the codes that we use to name the variables are mentioned in parentheses).
· The money is payable in the future and the question refers to how much the household is willing to sacri®ce to get the money now (S: speed-up), or the amount is payable immediately and the question refers to the additional amount the household requires to compensate for postponing the payment to some later point of time (D: delay). · The household will receive the money (G: gain) or has to pay (L: loss). · The time period that is covered: 3 months (03) or 12 months (12). · The amount of money that is at stake: D¯. 1000 (1) or D¯.100,000 (100). Nine out of the 16 possible combinations are used in the survey (see Table 1 ). The precise wording of, for example, the question DG12100 is as follows.
Imagine you win a cash prize in a lottery. The prize is worth D¯. 100,000 and can be paid out AT ONCE. Imagine the lottery, which is a ®nancially trustworthy organization, asks if you are prepared to wait a year before you get the prize. Would you agree to that proposal, or would you ask for more money if you had to wait for one year. What would you prefer: 1. I would agree to the waiting term of a year without requiring extra money for that. So after a year I receive D¯. 100,000. 2. I would agree to the waiting term of a year, but I want to receive extra money for that.
If the respondent wants extra money, the following question is asked:
How much extra money would you want to receive AT LEAST, in addition to the D¯. 100,000? For the households requiring extra money for waiting on the payment, the subjective interest rate is calculated from the questions mentioned above as r extra amount of money 100Y 000 X For households willing to wait without requiring additional money, we set the rate of time preference to zero. This concerns almost 6% of all households, see Table 1 . It could be the case that the`true' rate of time preference for these households is negative. An explanation might be that households want to restrain themselves from spending all the money at once, i.e., are prepared to pay a premium to enforce self-control (cf. the theory in Shefrin & Thaler (1988) , and the empirical evidence in Kahneman & Thaler (1991) ). The wording of the two other questions of the DG type are very similar, but lead to a much larger fraction of zero subjective interest rates (see Table 1 ).
The ®rst SG question (SG031) was:
Imagine you win a cash prize in a lottery. The prize is worth D¯. 1,000 and will be paid out in three months time. The lottery offers you to pay out the price immediately, but then you will receive a smaller amount of money. What would you prefer: 1. I will wait for three months and receive D¯. 1,000 then. 2. I want the money now and accept a smaller amount.
Only those who choose the second option answer a follow-up question similar to that in the DG case:
How much less than D¯1,000 would you accept if the amount is paid now?
The other SG questions and the DL questions are similar. The ®rst question does not specify how much the speed-up premium will be. Thus individuals who choose to wait do not necessarily prefer to receive the same amount later to receiving it now. This is dierent from the DG questions, which are formulated more precisely. Table 1 reveals that the majority of individuals choose the ®rst option and do not answer the question on the amount. These people may or may not prefer costless speeding up; Shelley (1993) extends the framing theory of Loewenstein (1988) and shows that in case of loss aversion it is possible that people with a positive rate of time preference prefer waiting to costless expediting. The explanation is that, compared to the original situation, expediting leads to a current loss and a future gain. The fact that losses are weighted heavier than gains may dominate the time preference. See Daniel (1994) , who uses the same data as we do, and links the dierences between the questions to various theories in economic psychology. (She works with individuals as units of observations, while we will work with households.) Table 1 also presents the means of the positive rates, with the three months answers transformed into annual rates. The means tend to be somewhat smaller in 1995 than in 1993. Together with the larger numbers of zeros this suggests that respondents in 1995 are more patient. The ordering of the means of the various questions remains the same. The rates based on the three months questions tend to be higher than those from the 12 months questions.
For the questions of the DG type, choosing the ®rst option in the ®rst question can be interpreted as a zero or negative subjective interest rate. The correlation between the subjective interest rates according to these three questions in both years, with zeroes for those who chose the ®rst option, are shown in Table 2 . They are all signi®cantly positive at the 5% level, and all but one at the 1% level. In the remainder of this paper we focus on the interest rate derived from DG12100, which refers to postponing payment of a realized gain, the largest amount of money, and the longest dierence in time. It has the smallest number of zeroes and its mean value seems plausible, although lower values of our measure of time preference could be expected if risk aversion and/or loss aversion were taken into account (see Shelley, 1993) .
The estimated probability density of the subjective interest rate based upon this question in 1995, for the two panels REP and HIP separately, is depicted in Fig. 1 . The households with a zero subjective interest rate are not included. This ®gure is drawn using non-parametric kernel density estimation (see H ardle & Linton (1994); the choice for the value of the smoothness parameter is based on visual inspection of the ®gures, the quartic kernel is used). The ®gure suggests that the density is bimodal, with modes at about 5% and 10%. In the HIP, the average rate (excluding the zeroes) is somewhat larger than in the REP (8.3% with standard error 0.3% in REP, versus 8.5% with standard error 0.3% in HIP in 1995 and similar in 1993).
Nonparametric regressions of the subjective interest rate on log family income and on age are shown in Fig. 2 (zeroes included; REP 1995 only). The ®gures suggest that the subjective interest rate is not related to income, and negatively related to age.
To test whether this remains to be the case if other background variables are controlled for, we explain the subjective interest rate using a standard tobit model: Here y Ã is a latent variable, y is the observed subjective interest rate, b is a vector of unknown parameters, is an error term, and x is a vector of explanatory variables. We used age, gender, and family income variables, dummies for education levels, family composition and employment status variables. After eliminating the variables that are insigni®cant, the only variables that remain are log age and gender (i.e., a dummy which is 1 for females and 0 for males). The slope coef®cients for log age are (standard errors in parentheses) À0X019 (0.007) in 1993 and À0X018 (0.008) in 1995. Thus older people tend to be more patient. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) already expected this, since younger people yet have to master the techniques of selfcontrol. The coef®cients on the dummy for females are À0X024 (0.005) in 1993 and À0X014 (0.005) in 1995, implying that women tend to be more patient than men. The tobit regressions had very small 2 values (0.02 in 1993, 0.01 in 1995), indicating that only a small part of the variation in the subjective interest rates can be explained by family characteristics and other background variables. (The 2 in the tobit model is de®ned as the estimate of fx H bga fx H bg r 2 Y the explained part of the variance of y Ã .)
Risk aversion
The value of the variable Riskaverse is the answer to the following question. I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns.
Heads of household who agree strongly with this statement are not willing to take ®nancial risks and are thus considered to be very risk averse.
The correlation between the risk aversion variable measured in 1993 and 1995 for the same households is 0.40 (and signi®cant at any conventional level). The distribution of outcomes for the two subpanels in 1995 are shown in Fig. 3 . Risk aversion in the representative panel is more dispersed than in the high income panel, with more very risk averse people as well as more people who are not risk averse at all. The average value is about 5.1 for both panels in both years. Fig. 4 shows the results of nonparametric regressions of Riskaverse on log family income and age, including uniform 95% con®dence bands (REP 1995 only) . No signi®cant relation with income can be detected, but the ®gure suggests that risk aversion increases signi®cantly with age.
To check whether these relations still hold if we control for other characteristics, we explain Riskaverse using an ordered probit model. The model is as follows.
Here y is the observed answer, the category bounds are ÀI m 0`m1`Á Á Á`m 6`m7 I. By means of normalization, m 1 is set to zero. m 2 Y F F F Y m 6 and the vector b are the parameters to be estimated. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood. In this model the observations of REP and HIP are combined. The results for both years are presented in Table 3 , for a speci®cation which only retains variables that are signi®cant in at least one of the two years. The 2 value (using the same de®nition as in the tobit model) of 0.05 in both years shows that the amount of variation we can explain is rather small, but we are better able to explain risk aversion than time preference. Log age and log age squared are jointly signi®cant in both years. The 1993 estimates imply that risk aversion increases from the age of 30, the 1995 estimates imply that risk aversion rises with age over the whole range. This might be a pure age eect or a cohort eect. Women are more risk averse than men, on average.
Log income is signi®cantly positive in 1993, but negative and insigni®cant in 1995. The traditional literature on the theory of portfolio allocation suggests that relative risk aversion decreases with wealth, while absolute risk aversion increases with wealth (see Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964) . If household income is seen as a proxy for wealth, our result can be reconciled with this if household heads interpret the question in a relative sense: the amount they have in mind for a``safe investment'' is some share of their income or wealth.
Income risk reduces the portfolio risk one is willing to take. This corresponds to Guiso et al. (1996) who ®nd a negative relation between income uncertainty and investment in risky assets. It leads to an increase of our measure of risk aversion. This implies that the measure of risk aversion we use depends on the family's circumstances and income uncertainty, and does not re¯ect underlying preferences only. In that sense, it does not measure thè true' risk aversion of the household's utility function, unconditional on labor market or health status. A drawback of our measure thus may be that it not only determines, but also depends on the family's ®nancial decisions. It is not clear whether a`true' measure which does not suer from this problem can be obtained; this would require much more from the wording of the questions and the respondents' ability to answer them. 
Financial interest
For the question on interest in ®nancial matters the same answering scheme was used as for the risk aversion variable. The exact question was. between interest in ®nancial matters and various control variables. The speci®cation is similar to that for risk aversion. Results are presented in Table  4 . The value of the 2 is a bit larger than the one for Riskaverse, but still rather low. Log age was retained in the model, though it appeared to be insigni®cant. Women tend to be less interested in ®nancial matters than men. Log income has a substantial positive impact, which can explain the dierence between REP and HIP in Fig. 5 . Dierent explanations for this ®nding can be given. First, high income families have more investment and portfolio allocation opportunities, and will therefore get more interested in ®nancial matters. Second, people with a large interest in ®nancial matters may have a larger preference for income compared to leisure or job characteristics than others. Therefore they more often accept the best paying job, and choose their portfolio eciently to maximize asset income.
The choice between owning and renting
One of the most important ®nancial decisions a household makes is the choice to buy a house or not. Wealth invested in the own house is by far the largest asset category in The Netherlands. All remaining households in the data answered the question whether they rented or owned their house. The exact question is.
Are you tenant, subtenant or owner or do you rent for free? If you live in more than one house, please report the mostimportant one.
The largest group of households own a house, 66.5% of the households in the 1993 REP (71.8% in 1995) and 91.9% of the households in the 1993 HIP (90.7% in 1995). 28.0% of the 1993 REP (33.0% in 1995) households are renting, while 0.5% (0.2% in 1995) are subtenants. We merge the subtenants with the renters. In Fig. 7 the probability that a household owns its residence is depicted as a function of age of the household head. The curve is smoothed using the same nonparametric regression techniques as in the previous section. The solid line refers to the 1995 REP, the broken line to the 1995 HIP. The probability of owning in the representative panel is hump shaped. It increases until about age 40, and decreases from age 55.
In general the choice between renting and owning will depend on income and wealth, on the possibility to obtain a mortgage, on expected returns to housing and ®nancial assets, on family composition, household preferences, etc. See, for example, Henderson and Ioannides (1983) for a theoretical model. Since many of the variables which would play a role according to theory were not measured, we do not consider structural models. Instead, we estimate a reduced form equation and focus on the impact of the variables discussed in the previous section. The rate of time preference and the risk aversion rate are features of household preferences. Since owning a house generally requires a large investment expenditure at the time the house is bought, the probability of home ownership can be expected to decrease with the rate of time preference. The same holds for the risk aversion measure: due to variation in housing prices, the returns to housing are usually more uncertain than average ®nancial assets, particularly since in The Netherlands, few households hold risky assets such as stocks or bonds. The bulk of ®nancial assets are saving accounts which are practically risk-free. (See Section 6 for details.) Moreover, the cost of renting is largely ®xed, while ownership costs may include a large fraction of uncertain maintenance costs. Finally, it is generally assumed that in the long run and on average, owning is cheaper than renting, also because of the tax rules which make owning relatively attractive. This makes it likely that households with more interest in ®nancial matters own more often than others. It could also be argued that causality works in the other direction here: families who have taken a mortgage were forced to show some ®nancial interest at that time.
The choice between renting and owning is modelled with a standard probit model. Thus the probability that a household owns its house equals Ux H aY where UÁ is the standard normal distribution function and a is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The model is estimated with maximum likelihood. The results are given in Table 5 . For 1995, the ®nancial interest variable is not available. To obtain comparable results, we therefore also present the 1993 results without the variable Finint. The 2 values, de®ned in the same way as in the tobit and ordered probit models in Section 2, show that we can explain a reasonable part of the variation in homeownership rates.
The probability of ownership increases with age of the head of the household. The joint eect of log age and log age squared is signi®cant, as is shown by a likelihood ratio test. Household income has a strong positive eect, as could be expected. Families with at least one working member (Work 1) have a larger probability of owning than families consisting of nonworkers only. If the head of the household has a partner (Married 1), this increases the probability of ownership. If the partner also has a job (Workp 1), the probability of owning a house increases even more. The signi®cance levels of these variables are rather dierent for 1993 and 1995, however.
The estimate for the variable Finint indicates that people who are more interested in ®nancial matters are more likely to own their home. This is consistent with our prior expectations given above: in the long run owning is cheaper than renting, mainly because interest on mortgages is fully tax-deductible, interest on ®nancial assets is taxed apart from a small tax exempt amount, and capital gains (on housing or other assets) are not taxed at all. People who are more interested in ®nancial matters will be more aware of this.
In 1993, a higher subjective interest rate makes it less likely for a household to own its home. This can be explained by the fact that the short run costs of having a house and a mortgage are higher than the rent for a house with similar characteristics. The payments however are partly used to pay o the mortgage and thus increase wealth. This is a long run eect and people using a high discount rate will give it less weight. A second explanation is that households with a higher discount rate are more likely to face binding liquidity constraints, making it harder for them to buy a house. Surprisingly, the subjective interest rate has the opposite sign in 1995, though it is signi-®cant at the 10% level only.
The parameter estimate on the risk aversion variable is insigni®cant and positive for both years. This could indicate that households do not see their house as a risky asset. For example, they may not plan to sell their house in the near future, so that they do not give much weight to uncertainty in future house prices. In the short run, rents may be more uncertain than the cost of owning. Due to the way in which risk aversion is measured, another explanation would also be possible: households owning their house face more risk than renters because of housing price volatility and uncertain maintenance costs, etc. This makes them less willing to take extra risks, and this is what the question on risk aversion refers to. This positive relation (higher risk aversion leads to a smaller ownership probability) and the reverse negative relation could cancel out each other. To investigate this further, it would be necessary to estimate a structural model. This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
The value of the house
Estimates of the probability densities of the current value of the house for the 1995 REP and HIP separately are given in Fig. 8 . The average current values (home owners only; in 1000 D¯.) are 231 (REP) and 353 (HIP) in 1993 and 251 (REP) and 386 (HIP) in 1995. The distributions in the REP and HIP are quite dierent. The distribution is strongly unimodal at about 200,000 D¯. in the 1995 REP. In the 1995 HIP, this peak is missing. The 95% uniform con®dence bands (not shown) do not overlap everywhere, implying that the dierence between the densities is signi®cant. A standard linear model is used to explain the log of the current value of the house, conditional on home ownership, for 1993 and 1995 (HIP and REP combined) . The estimated coecients and the corresponding standard errors can be found in Table 6 . The adjusted 2 shows that the model explains about one third of the variation in the value of the house. The value of the house increases with age and with family size. The latter is signi®cant in 1993 only. Married couples own more expensive houses than singles, but in 1995, this is only signi®cant if the partner has a paid job. As expected, the value of the house increases signi®cantly with income, implying that (owned) housing is a normal good. An income rise with 10% increases the value of the house by 3±4%. We also included the year the household moved into the house (Sincew). It appears that households who bought the house more recently, have more expensive houses, ceteris paribus. If the desired housing stock increases over the life cycle, this can be explained by heterogeneous adjustment costs.
The estimate for the variable indicating interest in ®nancial matters has a signi®cant positive sign. This suggests that the house is seen as a pro®table asset. More risk averse households tend to live in less expensive houses. This eect is signi®cant in 1995. It corresponds to the idea that a house is a risky asset, in which risk averse people will tend to invest less. Finally, the eect of the rate of time preference is positive but never signi®cant. Since we have conditioned on home ownership, there is no reason why the rate of time preference should have an impact.
The amount of mortgage
Households owning a house have ®rst answered a question on whether or not they have a mortgage. In the 1993 REP and HIP, 77.1% and 89.6% of the home owning families answered armatively. The data contain information on the year the mortgage was taken as well as on the year the family moved into its current house.
In Fig. 9 the relation between the fraction of mortgage taken and the current value of the house is shown. Households without mortgage are not included here. The dotted lines are 95% uniform con®dence bands. The ®gure shows that the fraction of mortgage taken and the value of the house are negatively related.
In Fig. 10 the estimated density of the fraction of the purchase value of the house taken as mortgage by the households is drawn, together with the 95% uniform con®dence bands. In this ®gure the 1995 REP and HIP are combined since the densities for the two panels are almost identical. Many households take almost the total amount of the value of the house as a mortgage. The probability that the fraction exceeds 1.4 is negligible. A plausible explanation for the fact that there are households with mortgages that substantially exceed the purchase value of the house is that these households used the money to rebuild their house after they bought it. This is con®rmed if we compare the dierence between the current value and the buying value for those with a higher mortgage with the others. The average yearly increase in the value of the house is more than 2% higher for households with a fraction of mortgage above 1.2. This dierence is signi®cant at the 5% level. Very small fractions of mortgage are also rare. Most of the density is concentrated between 0.75 and 1.25. The average fraction is 0.86 in the REP and 0.87 in the HIP (zeroes excluded).
Since the fraction of mortgage taken by a household will never be negative and there is a positive probability that a household has no mortgage, a tobit model is used to model the fraction of mortgage taken. In Table 7 , we present the results for 1993 as well as 1995. The 2 (as de®ned in Section 2) shows that we are able to explain a reasonable part of the variation in mortgage taking behavior. Conditional on all the other variables, the value of the house was not signi®cant, and we excluded it from the regression. The fraction of mortgage taken increases with age until about age 35, and decreases thereafter. The latter corresponds to the notion that for many people, housing equity is the most important form of saving. Household income has a positive eect on the fraction of mortgage. This could be expected since households with higher incomes will less often face credit constraints and are allowed to pay a smaller downpayment than low income households. The estimated eects of labor market status, marital status and family size appear to be rather different for 1993 and 1995. It should be noted here that labor supply could also be endogenous to the mortgage decision, particularly for married females. Fortin (1995) uses the amount of mortgage remaining to explain female labor supply and ®nds a signi®cant relationship. She assumes that the amount of mortgage is exogenous, however.
Households with a higher interest in ®nancial matters take a smaller fraction of the value of their house as mortgage than others. The eect of the subjective interest rate is positive but small and insigni®cant. The rate of risk aversion is also insigni®cant (and, unexpectedly, has a positive sign).
Ownership of risky assets
In this section we look at ®nancial assets. We distinguish between riskfree and risky assets. In the risky assets we include stocks, options, and mutual funds. Bonds and bond-related growth funds (safe mutual funds that invest only in bonds) are de®ned as riskless. There are not many households who do not own any form of risk-free assets (checking accounts, saving accounts, deposits, etc.; these assets are strictly spoken not risk-free if in¯ation risk is taken into account. In the Netherlands this is quite limited, however). Therefore, we focus on the category of risky assets, and in particular on the relation between the decision whether or not to hold risky assets and the subjective variables introduced in Section 2. Especially risk aversion is expected to have a strong eect.
In Fig. 11 nonparametric regressions of the dummy for ownership of risky assets on age, log family income and log wealth are drawn. All these variables have a positive relationship with the probability of owning risky assets.
A probit model has been estimated to quantify the eects of income, wealth, age and the subjective variables on the probability of owning risky assets. The results are presented in Table 8 together with the 2 for each model. The 2 values show that the model explains about half of the variation in risk taking behavior.
The age pattern is hump shaped, with a maximum probability of holding risky assets at age 50 (1995 data) or older (1993 data) . Log income has a positive sign, but is only signi®cant in 1993. The education dummies imply that investing in risky assets is more likely if the education level is higher. This might be due to the relation with lifetime income and wealth. Moreover, information costs related to investing in risky assets can be negatively related to education level. As expected, the eect of the level of wealth is positive and signi®cant. The pattern corresponds to the convex curve in Fig. 11 . The subjective measures of risk aversion and interest in ®nancial matters have the expected signs and are signi®cant. The subjective interest rate has a positive eect, but this is signi®cant in 1995 only. In a simple (life cycle) model of household behavior, the subjective discount rate does not inuence the portfolio composition of a household. It only aects the amount of savings; eects caused by dierent savings attitudes are likely to be taken up by the level of household wealth. If, however, credit constraints are introduced, it could be that households with a higher discount rate, prefer to see these constraints relaxed as soon as possible. These households might then invest in riskier assets with a higher expected return.
We checked the sensitivity of the results for the de®nition of risky assets. De®ning bonds and growth funds as risky instead of riskless assets gave results similar to those in the table. If (potentially endogenous) wealth variables are excluded from the regressors, the magnitudes of the eects change, but the signs and signi®cance levels of the subjective interest rate, risk aversion and ®nancial interest remain the same. Age, income and education eects change substantially, due to the large correlations between these variables and wealth. 
Conclusions
We have analyzed three subjective measures of household preferences which can in¯uence the household's ®nancial decisions: a measure of the rate of time preference, a measure of risk aversion, and a measure of interest in ®nancial matters. These variables are available in a survey of Dutch households. We have described these variables and we have investigated their relation to family characteristics and income. Second, we have analyzed their contribution to explaining ®nancial behavior related to housing and ownership of risky ®nancial assets.
Rates of time preference can be constructed from various questions in the survey relating to postponing or advancing payments. We ®nd signi®cant positive correlations between the rates constructed from dierent questions, and between rates in the two panel waves of the survey. This gives us some con®dence in the quality of the data. On the other hand, nonresponse is rather large and so is the number of observations with a zero rate of time preference according to some of the questions. This can be the result of the way questions are framed. We focus on the question which gives fewest zeroes, referring to the additional amount somebody wants to receive if a payment of D¯100,000 is postponed by one year. The distribution of the household speci®c rates of time preference constructed from this question seems plausible. Tobit regressions indicate that the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with age, and that women are more patient than men, but most variation in subjective interest rates cannot be explained from individual characteristics. According to the 1993 data, the subjective interest rate has the expected negative eect on the home ownership decision. Conditional on home ownership, however, it has no signi®cant impact on the value of the house or on the mortgage. Risk aversion is measured by a question on how important people think it is to invest in safe assets compared to aiming at a possibility of high returns. We ®nd that risk aversion increases with age and that women are more risk averse than men. We ®nd a substantial correlation of 0.4 between risk aversion rates in the same households in the 1993 and 1995 wave. More risk averse house owners tend to live in less expensive houses, which corresponds to the idea that the volatility of house prices makes a house a risky asset. Moreover, the eect of risk aversion on the decision to invest in ®nancial risky assets is negative and highly signi®cant.
Interest in ®nancial matters is measured on a similar ordinal scale. It increases with income and is larger for men than for women. Interest in ®nancial matters has a strong and signi®cant positive eect on the home ownership decision and on the value of home-owners' houses. This con®rms the view that owned housing is seen as a pro®table asset. Interest in ®nancial matters makes it more likely for a household to own risky assets.
In general we can conclude that the distributions of the psychological variables and the correlations between them are plausible. The extent to which they can be explained from family characteristics is quite limited. The eects of the subjective variables on ®nancial decisions related to housing and portfolio choice are in some cases quite strong and usually in line with economic theory, though there are some exceptions. The data have clear limitations, as already reported elsewhere (Daniel, 1994; Nyhus, 1996) . Still, we think our results are encouraging enough to conclude that this type of psychological variables are potentially a useful tool for the analysis of household behavior under uncertainty and in a life cycle framework. The questions could also be used in marketing surveys, to better identify groups of households who could be interested in buying ®nancial products such as risky mutual funds (for those with low rate of risk aversion and/or high interest in ®nancial matters), speci®c long term savings or retirement plans (those with low rate of time preference), etc.
We have used two waves of the panel, and have looked at some correlations over time. Most of the analyses have been carried out for the two waves separately. Though most of our results were similar for the two years, there were also some rather large changes, particularly in terms of signi®cance levels. Using more waves and exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data to a larger extent, should help to interpret these. It then also seems necessary to address the problems of nonresponse and panel selection and attrition. Another direction for future extensions is the use of more psychological questions for measuring the same concepts (such as the rate of risk aversion) or other concepts (such as expected income changes and income uncertainty), which are available in the data set but have not yet been used.
Appendix A. Some details on the data
In Table 9 , some explanatory variables included in some of the models are de®ned. Dummy; 1 if education level of the head of household is 1 (lowest level). The same for Edu2,F F F,Edu5 (5 is university level).
Income
Before tax income of the household (inc D¯.).
Married
Dummy; 1 if the head of the household is married. Age
Age of the head of the household. Wealth
Financial wealth of the household (excluding houses and mortgages).
